The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) invests millions of dollars in spacecraft and ground system development, and in mission operations in the pursuit of scientific knowledge of the universe. In recent years, NASA sent a probe to Mars to study the Red Planet's upper atmosphere, obtained high resolution images of Pluto, and it is currently preparing to find new exoplanets, rendezvous with an asteroid, and bring a sample of the asteroid back to Earth for analysis. The success of these missions is enabled by mission assurance. In turn, mission assurance is backed by information assurance. The information systems supporting NASA missions must be reliable as well as secure. NASAlike every other U.S. Federal Government agency -is required to manage the security of its information systems according to federal mandates, the most prominent being the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 and the legislative updates that followed it. Like the management of enterprise information technology (IT), federal information security management takes a "one-size fits all" approach for protecting IT systems. While this approach works for most organizations, it does not effectively translate into security of highly specialized systems such as those supporting NASA missions. These systems include command and control (C&C) systems, spacecraft and instrument simulators, and other elements comprising the ground segment. They must be carefully configured, monitored and maintained, sometimes for several years past the missions' initially planned life expectancy, to ensure the ground system is protected and remains operational without any compromise of its confidentiality, integrity and availability. Enterprise policies, processes, procedures and products, if not effectively tailored to meet mission requirements, may not offer the needed security for protecting the information system, and they may even become disruptive to mission operations. Certain protective measures for the general enterprise may not be as efficient within the ground segment. This is what the authors have concluded through observations and analysis of patterns identified from the various security assessments performed on NASA missions such as MAVEN, OSIRIS-REx, New Horizons and TESS, to name a few. The security audits confirmed that the framework for managing information system security developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the federal government, and adopted by NASA, is indeed effective. However, the selection of the technical, operational and management security controls offered by the NIST model -and how they are implementeddoes not always fit the nature and the environment where the ground system operates in even though there is no apparent impact on mission success. The authors observed that unfit controls, that is, controls that are not necessarily applicable or sufficiently effective in protecting the mission systems, are often selected to facilitate compliance with security requirements and organizational expectations even if the selected controls offer minimum or non-existent protection. This paper identifies some of the standard security controls that can in fact protect the ground system, and which of them offer little or no benefit at all. It offers multiple scenarios from real security audits in which the controls are not effective without, of course, disclosing any sensitive information about the missions assessed. In addition to selection and implementation of controls, the paper also discusses potential 1 Information System Security Engineer (ISSE), General Dynamics Mission Systems (GDMS), non-member. 2 Information System Security Officer (ISSO), General Dynamics Mission Systems (GDMS), non-member.
enterprise/corporate systems) were out of scope of the assessments. Nonetheless, organizations that have adopted or that are in the process of adopting the NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) could benefit from the focus of this paper, specifically through the reviews of the rationale for each of the recommended tailoring proposed herein. ISOs from non-federal information systems could also benefit from this discussion if they have or will be adopting the RMF, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, or other risk model. Regardless, ISOs must fully understand the mission, the environment in which the mission operates in, and the resources available to them so the tailoring process is completed successfully and effectively.
Assumptions
The focus of this paper is on the selection and implementation of (NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 revision 4 MODERATE 7 ) security controls as part of the NIST RMF. The authors assume that other steps of the security life cycle are performed correctly. It is also assumed that the RMF model and its security controls 8 will change over time; however, the selection and implementation rationale may remain the same. The authors assume organizations have resources for the management and the support of information security, and have a working knowledge of the federal information security life cycle. Also, the elements that are mentioned throughout the paper are entities that comprise the ground system, and are operated by organizations. These organizations are NASA centers, NASA projects/missions, laboratories, universities, private companies, etc.
Disclaimer
While many organizations perform some customization/tailoring of security controls, some still oversee this important step of the security life cycle from the RMF. This paper intends to identify a few of the security controls that may be considered to be tailored to better protect and support the ground segment with focus on mission development and operations. Just like the idea of having a one size fits all for enterprise IT security brings challenges and concerns, the recommended tailoring proposed herein may not fit all like environments, and must be analyzed prior to implementation. In other words, these are only recommendations for customization; in fact, these recommendations are intended for ISOs of elements supporting the ground segment to consider when selecting the security controls for their information systems. This is not a recipe for selecting and implementing security controls, but rather considerations for reference. Also, organizations should not be limited to the controls in the NIST SP 800-53 catalog 9 . Consider other security controls if applicable and as necessary. Finally, throughout this paper, some illustrations from actual security assessment findings will be provided to assist in the understanding of a given point. These cannot be traced back to any specific organization as such information is kept confidential for the protection of the assessed organization.
II. The Ground System
The ground system is comprised of multiple elements, each responsible for a specific aspect of the mission: Mission operations, science operations, ground stations, launch site, etc. Each element may be operated by a different organization (NASA centers, universities, laboratories, corporations). Needless to say, each element, and the mission network(s) connecting them are and must remain protected from unauthorized access and disruption. Most mission-agnostic elements such as ground stations, mission network service providers, launch service providers, etc. are already highly compliant with federal security requirements. Non-mission-agnostic elements such as Mission Operations Centers (MOCs), Science Operation Centers (SOCs), and Instrument Team Facilities (ITFs) may barely be compliant with federal security requirements, and these are the elements that the authors aim to reach with this publication.
III. The Security Life Cycle
The Risk Management Framework (RMF) is a 6-step cycle aimed at selecting, applying, and verifying the appropriate security controls to provide confidentiality, integrity and availability assurance to federal information systems, and continuously monitoring the effectiveness of these controls. The level of protection required to provide confidentiality, integrity and availability assurance to the information system will depend on the value of the data/information to be protected. Therefore, the security life cycle begins with the categorization of the data based on the type of information. The output of the categorization process, described in SP 800-60 and Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 199, is either LOW, MODERATE or HIGH security rating. For each rating, NIST provides security control baselines that can be tailored during the selection step of the security life cycle. Most of the baselined security controls from catalog are acceptable by organizations to meet minimum security requirements. After the controls are implemented, they must be assessed to verify compliance and effectiveness. After the implementation evaluation results and residual risks are reviewed and accepted, the information is ultimately authorized to operate. Once the information system is authorized, it must be continuously monitored to ensure controls are still applicable, relevant and effective. A description of each RMF step can be found in chapter 3 of NIST SP 800-37 10 . Table I The 6-step NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF)
NIST Risk Management Framework
Step 1: CATEGORIZE Information Systems (FIPS 199/SP 800-60)
Step 2: SELECT Security Controls (FIPS 200/SP 800-53)
Step 3: IMPLEMENT Security Controls (SP 800-160)
Step 4: ASSESS Security Controls (SP 800-53A)
Step 5: AUTHORIZE Information Systems (SP 800-37)
Step 6: MONITOR Security Controls (SP 800-137)
IV. The Tailoring Process
Organizations implementing the NIST RMF can certainly benefit from the security in-depth (layered) approach that the model offers, in particular by the technical, operational and management controls from the NIST baseline security control catalog. Because of the interdependencies between the controls, it is advisable to not only select as many controls as applicable to the security rating 11 of the system but also fully implement them if at all possible. When it is not possible to fully implement the controls as recommended by NIST even when the controls are applicable to the system, then is its necessary to customize the controls.
Tailoring of the controls is necessary to avoid force-fitting them to support the unique environment and operations of the ground system. This important step of the SELECTION phase can assist in the understanding and implementation of the controls as well as facilitate the assessment of the controls. 10 NIST SP 800-37, Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems A Security Life Cycle Approach [online], URL: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-37-rev1/sp800-37-rev1-final.pdf [cited 12 August 2016]. 11 
Security Categorization
The tailoring process is summarized as follows: Tailored controls need to be documented in the system security plan (SSP), and verification systems (e.g., vulnerability scanners) configured accordingly. The idea is to document deviations in support of not only the implementation of the controls but in the verification of the controls during the security assessment and continuous monitoring steps.
V. Tailoring Select Security Controls by Key Security Groups
Once security controls are selected from the NIST SP 800-53 catalog (step 2 of the Risk Management Framework security lifecycle), the organization must determine its Organization-Defined Values (ODVs). Without these values, projects have little or no implementation guidance. Also, without these, audits can become very challenging as one cannot verify a requirement is being met if the requirement is only partially defined.
Organizations must ensure that policies are in place for all security control families. These are the first controls of each security control family in the catalog ("XX-1 controls" where XX is the abbreviation of the security control family). Like ODVs, policies must be well defined, accessible, understood, and auditable or else they cannot be followed and/or enforced. Unfortunately, some policies are not tailored enough for the ground system and mission operations environment. At times, they are not tailored at all for such environment making it difficult to implement and assess 13 .
12 NIST SP 800-53 The following is a collection of candidate controls to be tailored for the highly specialized systems supporting ground system and mission operations. Each control family has been grouped under the following security groups:
A. ACCESS CONTROL B. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT C. MAINTENANCE AND MONITORING D. MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT These groups (not to be confused with the security control families of the same/similar names) are aligned with the key security groups proposed by Takamura et. al.
14 when implementing and assessing critical elements such as Mission Operations Centers (MOCs).
This compilation is a result of observed patterns from various security assessments performed on NASA ground systems and mission operations, and they do not reflect the current implementation of a single or multiple information systems. The intent is not to show how controls are being implemented but rather how it could be implemented taking into consideration the environment, the nature of operations, the processes that must be followed, etc. 
Reality:
In order to reduce costs, missions/projects assign some of the IT security roles and responsibilities to IT support personnel, which makes it difficult to observe the principle of separation of duties. The review of audit logs by System Administrators (SAs), for instance, could be viewed as a risk since SAs have elevated privileges on the system, thus the capability to delete audit records. Adding the role of audit log reviewers to SAs may be inevitable due to limited mission/project budget during operations and especially during extended mission life. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: If separation of duties is not possible, assign mission support personnel to perform random inspections/verifications to ensure privileges are not being misused or abused.
Unsuccessful Login Attempts
(AC-07) Terminals cannot afford to be locked by a given operator (or even the unlikely unauthorized user) after a number of unsuccessful login attempts occur. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: To prevent accidental (or intentional) denial of service by any of the multiple operators (or by hackers), especially after a password is changed, but to meet the intent of the control, set the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is set to a high number. For instance, instead of 10 failed attempts, set it to 50 or 100. This is only "safe to do so" if compensating controls are in place (e.g., segregated logical and physical environments each with controlled access). 
System Use Notification

Publicly Accessible Content (AC-22)
NIST:
The organization: (a) Designates individuals authorized to post information onto a publicly accessible information system; (b) trains authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain nonpublic information; (c) reviews the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible information system to ensure that nonpublic information is not included; and (d) reviews the content on the publicly accessible information system for nonpublic information [organization-defined frequency] and removes such information, if discovered.
NIST supplemental guidance:
In accordance with federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and/or guidance, the general public is not authorized to nonpublic information (e.g., information protected under the Privacy Act and proprietary information). This control addresses information systems that are controlled by the organization and accessible to the general public, typically without identification or authentication. The posting of information on nonorganization information systems is covered by organizational policy. Reality: With the exception of data archiving elements, GS/MO elements do not offer publicly accessible content. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: De-select control if no publicly accessible content is offered.
IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (IA)
Identification and Authentication | Acceptance of PIV Credentials IA-02 (12) NIST:
The information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials.
NIST supplemental guidance: This control enhancement applies to organizations implementing logical access control systems (LACS) and physical access control systems (PACS). Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents. OMB Memorandum 11-11 requires federal agencies to continue implementing the requirements specified in HSPD-12 to enable agency-wide use of PIV credentials. Reality:
The ground system is often comprised of elements operated by government, industry and academia. There is no federated solution for deploying personal identification verification (PIV) cards across the ground system to identify and authenticate users from all elements.
Also, many of the ground system elements operate in a multi-user environment in which a single (group) account is needed so sessions span multiple shifts. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: De-select the control if PIV credentials cannot be utilized.
Identification and Authentication | Acceptance of PIV Credentials From
Other Agencies (IA-8(1))
NIST:
The information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials from other federal agencies.
NIST supplemental guidance: This control enhancement applies to logical access control systems (LACS) and physical access control systems (PACS). Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents. OMB Memorandum 11-11 requires federal agencies to continue implementing the requirements specified in HSPD-12 to enable agency-wide use of PIV credentials. Reality:
The ground system is often comprised of elements operated by government, industry and academia. There is no federated solution for deploying personal identification verification (PIV) cards across the ground system to identify and authenticate users from all elements and from other agencies.
Also, many of the ground system elements operate in a multi-user environment in which a single (group) account is needed so sessions span multiple shifts. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: De-select the control if PIV credentials from other agencies cannot be utilized. NIST supplemental guidance: When it is known that information systems, system components, or devices (e.g., notebook computers, mobile devices) will be located in high-risk areas, additional security controls may be implemented to counter the greater threat in such areas coupled with the lack of physical security relative to organizational-controlled areas. [..] Reality: Mobile devices are rarely utilized for operations. When they do, it is mostly for internal work, and they do not leave the premises. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: De-select control if devices do not leave the premises.
PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Configuration Change
The organization: (a) Determines the types of changes to the information system that are configuration-controlled; (b) reviews proposed configuration-controlled changes to the information system and approves or disapproves such changes with explicit consideration for security impact analyses; (c) documents configuration change decisions associated with the information system; (d) implements approved configuration-controlled changes to the information system; (e) retains records of configuration controlled-changes to the information system for [organization-defined time period]; (f) audits and reviews activities associated with configuration-controlled changes to the information system; and (g) coordinates and provides oversight for configuration change control activities through [organization-defined configuration change control element (e. NIST:
The organization: (a) Develops and documents an inventory of information system components that: (1) accurately reflects the current information system; (2) includes all components within the authorization boundary of the information system; (3) is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and reporting; and (4) includes [organization-defined information deemed necessary to achieve effective information system component accountability]; and (b) reviews and updates the information system component inventory [organization-defined frequency].
NIST supplemental guidance: Organizations may choose to implement centralized information system component inventories that include components from all organizational information systems. Reality: Some organizations are still manually inventorying assets, making it a timeconsuming and laborious effort. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: Credentialed vulnerability scan reports, if configured appropriately, may provide an automated method for obtaining information system component inventories. 
MEDIA PROTECTION
SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION
Network Disconnect (SC-10)
The information system terminates the network connection associated with a communications session at the end of the session or after [organization-defined time period] of inactivity.
NIST supplemental guidance: This control applies to both internal and external networks. Terminating network connections associated with communications sessions include, for example, deallocating associated TCP/IP address/port pairs at the operating system level, or de-allocating networking assignments at the application level if multiple application sessions are using a single, operating system-level network connection. Reality: Most terminals cannot/should not be disconnected from the network at the end of a sessions or after a pre-determined period of inactivity. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: Identify the devices that cannot/should not be disconnected from the network (which is basically all of the assets); and remove/waive requirement from them.
Compensating controls include segregated logical and physical environments each with controlled access.
Cryptographic Protection (SC-13)
NIST:
The information system implements [organization-defined cryptographic uses and type of cryptography required for each use] in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.
NIST supplemental guidance: Cryptography can be employed to support a variety of security solutions including, for example, the protection of classified and Controlled Unclassified Information, the provision of digital signatures, and the enforcement of information separation when authorized individuals have the necessary clearances for such information but lack the necessary formal access approvals. [..]
Reality: Some elements utilize insecure protocols (e.g., FTP) when uploading nonsensitive data to an archive. The argument provided is that the data is not sensitive, and therefore does not need to be encrypted. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: Regardless of whether the data being transferred is sensitive or not, the user performing the uploading of the data needs to be authenticated, and the credentials utilized must be protected. Else, they can be sniffed, and acquired by anyone listening to the network(s) between the client and the server. Comment: Mission/project personnel can collaborate using non-mission devices.
Collaborative
Session Authenticity (SC-23)
The information system protects the authenticity of communications sessions.
NIST supplemental guidance:
This control addresses communications protections at the session, versus packet level (e.g., sessions in service-oriented architectures providing web-based services) and establishes grounds for confidence at both ends of communications sessions in ongoing identities of other parties and in the validity of information transmitted. Authenticity protection includes, for example, protecting against man-in-the-middle attacks/session hijacking and the insertion of false information into sessions. Reality: Some of the web applications in use within the GS/MO environment utilize selfsigned Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificates. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: Self-signed SSL certificates OK as clients are generally in the same LAN as the web servers, and so the web server identities do not need to be verified by a Certification Authority (CA). 
Protection of Information at Rest
C. Maintenance and Monitoring
AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Auditable Events (AU-02)
NIST:
The organization: (a) Determines that the information system is capable of auditing the following events: [organization-defined auditable events]; (b) coordinates the security audit function with other organizational entities requiring audit-related information to enhance mutual support and to help guide the selection of auditable events; (c) provides a rationale for why the auditable events are deemed to be adequate to support after-the-fact investigations of security incidents; and (d) determines that the following events are to be audited within the information system: [organization-defined audited events (the subset of the auditable events defined in AU-02a) along with the frequency of (or situation requiring) auditing for each identified event].
NIST supplemental guidance: An event is any observable occurrence in an organizational information system. Organizations identify audit events as those events which are significant and relevant to the security of information systems and the environments in which those systems operate in order to meet specific and ongoing audit needs. 
SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION
Security Assessments (CA-02)
NIST:
The organization: (a) Develops a security assessment plan that describes the scope of the assessment including: (1) security controls and control enhancements under assessment; (2) assessment procedures to be used to determine security control effectiveness; and (3) assessment environment, assessment team, and assessment roles and responsibilities; (b) assesses the security controls in the information system and its environment of operation [organization-defined frequency] to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting established security requirements; (c) produces a security assessment report that documents the results of the assessment; and (d) provides the results of the security control assessment to [organization-defined individuals or roles].
NIST supplemental guidance: Organizations assess security controls in organizational information systems and the environments in which those systems operate as part of (i) Also, certain processes such as documentation development are not followed since the personnel supporting the element are often "veteran" professionals having worked on previous missions.
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: Mission management must be prepared to ensure the information technology supporting the mission keeps up with advances in technology. By keeping hardware and software updated, risks related to obsolesce are avoided. Potential problems include lack of funding for maintenance, technology refreshes, and support personnel for maintaining the information systems.
About the lack of documentation (e.g., procedural documents) by seasoned support personnel, if there is low turnover of management and support staff, then the risk of not documenting certain procedures need to be reviewed, analyzed, documented and accepted. Tailoring, in this case, may not be helpful. Some mission assets cannot be patched/updated since they were built to simulate the software that is currently running on the spacecraft. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: Tailor the control to perform patching/updates at an interval that will not impact the mission. Compensating control may include strong configuration management processes.
RISK ASSESSMENT
If patches cannot be deployed at least monthly, then every other month or every quarter. Because of the volume of patches/updates that accumulate each month, waiting longer than a quarter to deploy the patch is not advisable. The patch frequency tailored for GS/MO devices should also be coordinated with vulnerability assessment cadence so that the devices are scanned right after they are patched for more accurate results. Also, it is important to perform more extensively any testing before (and after) patching operational systems.
For assets that cannot be updated, missions must identify and document compensating controls that offer protection to these vulnerable systems. Many of the GS/MO devices runs Linux/UNIX operating systems. There is a perception that there is little value of running anti-virus software on these systems. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: There are viruses and worms for all computing platforms including mobile devices. On Linux/UNIX systems, most of the malware are only effective if the systems are running vulnerable software. If the elements keep the systems up-todate with the latest patches/updates, the likelihood of these systems from becoming infected is very low. The fact that these systems are segregated logically and physically with controlled access drops the probability of infection to even lower levels.
Malicious Code Protection
Even if auto-protection (aka., on-access virus scanning) is not available on these systems, elements may consider tailoring the control to waive the frequent full scanning, especially if files do not change often. As a result, unnecessary processes (e.g., weekly full virus scans) wearing out media storage (disks) will be avoided.
Spam Protection (SI-08)
The organization: (a) Employs spam protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points to detect and take action on unsolicited messages; and (b) updates spam protection mechanisms when new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures.
NIST supplemental guidance: Information system entry and exist points include, for example, firewalls, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, workstations, mobile devices, and notebook/laptop computers. [..] Reality: By design, mail service is disabled within GS/MO elements. If the service is enabled then access to the server is restricted. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: De-select this control is mail service is not enabled. If it is, ensure that the service only listens to the localhost (assuming service is enabled for internal use only).
D. Management and Support
AWARENESS AND TRAINING
Role-Based Security Training (AT-03)
The organization provides role-based security training to personnel with assigned security roles and responsibilities; (a) before authorizing access to the information system or performing assigned duties; (b) when required by information system changes; and (c) [organization-defined frequency] thereafter.
NIST supplemental guidance: Organizations determine the appropriate content of security training based on the assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals and the specific security requirements of organizations and the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. [..] Reality: Mission/project personnel assuming specific roles are not always trained (sometimes there are no training requirements for certain roles). Tailoring recommendation/rationale: System Administrators, Account Administrators, Developers, Database Administrators, Network Administrators, Security Administrators (ISSEs), Security Managers (ISSOs), Information System Owners (ISOs) should all take role-based security training at least once every 3 years.
Comments: For missions on extended life, there is often a reduction in staff including IT support. As a result, support staff may take on IT and/or IT security roles which the staff may or may not be qualified (risk). Training  (AT-03) NIST:
Role-Based Security
NIST supplemental guidance: Organizations determine the appropriate content of security training based on the assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals and the specific security requirements of organizations and the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. [..] Reality: Some organizations require personnel with specific roles (e.g., System Administrators) to take annual refresher training using static and often old materials. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: Because many of the specialized personnel are qualified personnel who are proficient in their craft, the annual requirement could be modified so that the refresher is only required every 3 years. NIST supplemental guidance: System-level information includes, for example, system-state information, operating system and application software, and licenses. User-level information includes any information other than system-level information. [..] Reality: Many organizations place emphasis on having hot sites for their key elements (e.g., mission operations centers); however, when hot sites do not exist, CP is often "dismissed." The only remaining protective measure seems to be data backups.
CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Tailoring recommendation/rationale: Backups are important, and must be performed whether an alternate processing site exists or not. They should be part of the CM process in case data is to be restored after a failed change to the system. NIST:
INCIDENT RESPONSE
The organization: (a) Determines information security requirements for the information system or information system service in mission/business process planning; (b) determines, documents, and allocates the resources required to protect the information systems or information system service as part of its capital planning and investment control processes; and (c) establishes a discrete line item for information security in organizational programming and budgeting documentation.
NIST supplemental guidance: Resource allocation for information security includes funding for the initial information system or information system service acquisition and funding for the sustainment of the system/service. Reality: Legacy missions/projects, that is, missions on extended life have minimum funding to continue their science operations. Unfortunately, the budget for these missions may not be enough to cover the expenses related to information technology. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: The tailoring of the control is for legacy missions only. Identify all controls that cannot be implemented by a limited-funded mission/project, and document the deviations in the SSP.
System Development Life Cycle (SA-03)
The organization: (a) Manages the information system using [organizationdefined system development life cycle] that incorporates information security considerations; (b) defines and documents information security roles and responsibilities throughout the system development life cycle; (c) identifies individuals having information security roles and responsibilities; and (d) integrates the organizational information security risk management process into system development life cycle activities.
NIST supplemental guidance: A well-defined system development life cycle provides the foundation for the successful development, implementation, and operation of organizational information systems. [..] Reality: Throughout the development phases of the mission, projects go through various milestone reviews which allow NASA to learn the development status of the various aspects of the project, and of course verify that the requirements for a specific milestone review are being satisfied. Current project milestone review requirements for IT security focus mostly on security documents. Projects/missions naturally place emphasis on security documentation, not necessarily on security processes (e.g., one-time vulnerability scans vs. continuous monitoring). While IT security documentation is a required necessity to support certain managed processes, the check-the-box review approach does not provide any benefit to the mission/project unless the core of the documentation, that is, the actual contents, is reviewed and scrutinized. Tailoring recommendation/rationale: In addition to meeting all project milestone review criteria, missions/projects should consider reporting on the status of other IT risk management processes as well. (SA-08) NIST:
Security Engineering Principles
The organization applies information system security engineering principles in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the information system. It is important to note that not all tailoring will be accepted or approved by the organization, especially when little or no organizational tolerance for deviations from standard (enterprise) implementation exists.
VI. Enterprise IT Security
Standardized IT solutions aim to be deployed in mass, covering as many divisions and departments as possible. The less customization and deviation from the standards the better and easier for the organization to verify implementation and compliance. As deployments are customized and tailored for certain environments, the organization must keep track of changes, and assume a different posture when assessing the tailored implementation. That is why there is often organizational resistance in permitting the customization of these deployments, including the selection, tailoring and scoping of the baseline security controls. One size does not fits all.
To date, FISMA attempted to apply baselined security controls across the federal government to standardize the management of information security. It took on a one size fits all approach, but gave agencies enough leeway to tailor the baselined controls so they better fit the business environments in which these agencies operate in. With the update to FISMA in 2014, the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), an amendment to the 2002 Act, designated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the responsibility and authority to administer agency information security policies and practices. One of the outcomes from this update is the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program.
The CDM program being deployed across the federal government remains consistent with the one size fits all philosophy, and aims at the enterprise as a whole. Among the initiatives that are part of this program is the employment of automated tools to perform "periodic risk assessments, testing of security procedures, and detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents." 16 Highly specialized systems such as NASA's ground systems and mission operations are included under the CDM program, that is, are required to meet the requirements for the assessment and reporting of security (or lack thereof). Certainly, a thorough review of the security impact of the deployment of CDM sensors 17 on these highly specialized systems must be performed to prevent risks and/or impact to missions/projects. Over the years, missions/projects have developed internal processes to ensure that mission operations are not impacted by day-to-day IT management and IT security activities. The work that NASA does is sponsored by U.S. taxpayers, and as such, the Agency must be diligent in ensuring that the investment that it does on its missions is protected.
VII. Conclusion
Security audits are conducted not only to ensure that requirements are met (compliance verification) but also to identify problems, especially recurring problems, and their root causes so they can be prevented in the future. As we observe these recurring problems across multiple organizations, we the authors feel the professional responsibility to help the aeronautics and astronautics community address common issues affecting specifically the implementation and assessment of security controls. Most of these issues are caused by the improper selection of the security controls, in particular the lack of tailoring of the security controls to ensure that the controls fit the ground system (and mission operations) environment. By compiling a set of security controls based on their candidacy for tailoring into a single list, we believe we can assist current and future elements and organizations in (a) analyzing the applicability of security controls; (b) identifying deviations from the baselines; (c) identifying compensating controls for each deviation; and (d) document the tailored controls in the SSP. This list is not a recipe for customizing the baseline controls for the ground system, especially because each environment is unique. So unique it should not be treated the same as the rest of the enterprise. We hope we can provide insight to Information System Owners as they take this important step of the security life cycle. CDM tools that collect information from devices, and report the information to a centralized report server (Federal Dashboard 
